Can an Algorithm Be Sacred? Affect, Embodiment, and the Spiritual Status of Artificial Intelligence: A Spinozist, Cross-Traditional Inquiry
RELIGIONS, cilt.17, sa.9, ss.1-15, 2026 (AHCI, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 17 Sayı: 9
- Basım Tarihi: 2026
- Doi Numarası: 10.3390/rel17091049
- Dergi Adı: RELIGIONS
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Academic Search Ultimate (EBSCO), Scopus, Religion Database (ProQuest), Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI), ATLA Religion Database, Index Islamicus, Linguistic Bibliography, Directory of Open Access Journals
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.1-15
- Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu: AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
- İnönü Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
The question of whether artificial intelligence could bear the imago Dei, possess a soul, be a subject of salvation, or suffer in a religiously weighty sense increasingly frames debates at the intersection of AI and faith. Such debates typically rest on an intellectualist criterion: they treat mind as intelligence or information processing, so that as machine performance advances, the sacred core of the human appears to be encroached upon. This article challenges that framing through Baruch Spinoza. For Spinoza, the mind is the idea of an actually existing body, not a separable soul‑substance; the essence of any finite thing is its conatus, its striving to persevere in being; and affects are lived transitions in the body’s power of acting. On this view (placed in dialogue with affective and homeostatic accounts of consciousness) the seat of religious inwardness is not intelligence alone but affective self‑maintenance, whose culmination Spinoza names blessedness, the intellectual love of God. Tested against selected loci of religious and moral standing in several traditions—the Christian imago Dei, the Islamic rūḥ/nafs/qalb, and Buddhist accounts of noself and suffering—the criterion reveals a limited but significant convergent orientation beyond bare intelligence toward affective, relational, or experientially valenced forms of inwardness. Applying it, I argue that, on the present evidence, the current large language models and comparable generative systems examined here do not exhibit an embodied, self‑maintaining organization whose changes are affectively registered from within and are therefore not candidates for the spiritual status at issue—not because they lack a separable soul‑substance, which Spinoza denies that humans possess, but because they lack embodied affective striving. The properly religious risk is thus not presently demonstrated machine spirituality but the idolatrous misidentification of affective simulation with affective reality.